Kim's Heavy Guns on the Trans-Siberian Railway: Koksan on Their Way to War

The photograph started circulating on Telegram over the past 24 hours. Koksan artillery pieces are so distinctive that identifying them was straightforward. More time was required to determine where the photo was taken, but it was eventually pinpointed thanks to a characteristic building in the background, located at Svetlogorskaya Street 15 in the northern part of Krasnoyarsk. This location is near a branch of the Trans-Siberian Railway passing through this Siberian city.

Interestingly, this same area has been used to record other footage of Russian trains carrying weaponry heading west. It seems that someone in the industrial facilities on the other side of the railway enjoys filming military trains and sharing them online. As for the train with the North Korean artillery, it’s unclear which direction it was headed, but given the circumstances, westward seems likely.

A unique weapon from the Land of Kims

The Koksan is a peculiar North Korean creation, a 170 mm cannon initially mounted on the chassis of an old Chinese Type 59 tank (a Chinese modification of the Soviet T-54) and later on something likely based on the Soviet ATS-59 artillery tractor. The origins of this unusual caliber remain a mystery. Some speculate it may be derived from the German 17 cm Kanone 18 heavy gun from World War II, which might have reached North Korea through the USSR. Others suggest a modification of Soviet 180 mm naval guns. Either way, 170 mm is an extremely uncommon caliber for self-propelled artillery, making it unique.

Little is known about the actual combat capabilities of Koksan guns. According to assessments from the South Korean military and Western analysts, North Korea considered them a primary tool for bombarding Seoul in the event of renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Their range is estimated at up to 40 kilometers with standard ammunition and 60 kilometers with rocket-assisted projectiles. However, they are likely cumbersome to operate due to the heavy shells and the lack of an automatic loading system. This results in a very low rate of fire, estimated at less than one shot per minute. The cannon is also likely not very accurate.

Koksans were used sparingly during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, when North Korea supplied about 20 of these guns to Iran. Their operational use during that conflict remains unclear, but they were employed for surface bombardment of targets such as cities and refineries.

In comparison with contemporary self-propelled artillery, the Koksan is an outdated and inferior design, lagging behind even the Soviet 2S7 Pion (caliber 203 mm) from the same era. The Koksan's main drawbacks include its low rate of fire, poor accuracy, and likely a long setup time for combat. Its main advantages are its long range and the simple fact that it exists.

Poor Quality, But They’re Here

The sighting of Koksans in Russia is both good and bad news. The good news is that the need to import such niche and subpar artillery from North Korea indirectly confirms that Russia is struggling with its own artillery supplies. It’s no secret that Russia is facing shortages due to losses and wear during the ongoing war. Thanks in part to North Korea, the primary issue is not ammunition shortages, which are reportedly manageable. Instead, the problem lies with the barrels and the guns and howitzers themselves.

Artillery barrels wear out quickly during sustained firing. Each has a specified lifespan, usually ranging from a few thousand to tens of thousands of rounds. As they wear out, accuracy decreases, and once a critical point is reached, the risk of barrel rupture becomes significant. Ideally, barrels are regularly replaced, and each gun or howitzer should have a reserve supply. During the Soviet era, barrel production was extensive, but this ceased after the USSR's collapse. Today, Russia struggles with production capacity. Modern artillery barrels require months of preparation, as the metal must "rest" to achieve the necessary properties. While this hasn’t led to a total collapse of Russian artillery, it has significantly reduced its effectiveness compared to the early stages of the war.

In this context, even substandard North Korean artillery can still be useful—especially given its long range. It’s possible that the train also carries crews and ammunition, which would simplify matters for the Russians, as North Korean systems are entirely foreign to their logistics and training infrastructure.

Ukraine, too, wouldn’t object to receiving such support. In a war of attrition, every functioning barrel capable of delivering death toward the enemy is valuable. North Korean Koksan artillery pieces are an asset for Russia. What Moscow is paying for this support is unknown, but it is likely a mix of money, raw materials, and technology—just as it is for everything the Kim Jong Un regime provides to Russia.